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THE CUSTODY REQUIREMENT AND TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS:
WORD v. NORTH CAROLINA
Prisoners Word, Matthews, and Williams were serving sentences
imposed upon them in and by the Commonwealth of Virginia. During
the course of their respective incarcerations, each had been returned to
North Carolina to stand trial for another offense, convicted, sentenced,
and sent back to Virginia to complete the remainder of his sentence
there. North Carolina authorities lodged a detainer against each of the
three, so that he would be available to serve the North Carolina sentence
upon completion of the Virginia confinement.
The prisoners sought the remedy of federal habeas corpus to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the sentences to be served in North
Carolina upon completion of the Virginia commitments.' Williams
sought relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina, while Word and Matthews brought their actions in
the Eastern District of Virginia.
The prisoners' petitions were dismissed by the respective district
courts in which they were filed.2 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals consolidated the cases to decide the question "whether . . .
federal habeas corpus provides a present remedy for a state prisoner
seeking to attack, on constitutional grounds, a conviction in another
state which underlies a detainer filed with his keeper." ' Rejecting the
alternative that the prisoners postpone any remedy until they have com-
pleted service of their Virginia sentences and have been delivered into
the physical custody of a North Carolina warden, the court held, in
Word v. North Carolina,4 that federal habeas corpus did provide a
present remedy for the state prisoners. In light of the Supreme Court's
affirmance of Peyton v. Rowe,5 Chief Judge Haynsworth, writing for
the majority, again 6 inveighed against the "custody" requirement of
IA state prisoner, seeking federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1964),
must first meet the requirements of § 2254 by demonstrating that he has "exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence
of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; 113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1303 (1965). See gen-
erally Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D.
45 (1969) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding,
74 HAnv. L. Rsv. 1315 (1961).
2 Word v. North Carolina, 406 F2d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 1969).
3 Id. at 353.
4This argument was drawn from the essence of the "prematurity doctrine" set
forth in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). But see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968) (overruling McNally).
6391 U.S. 54 (1968).
6 See Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
For commentary on the Rowe decision, see 9 Wm. & MARY L. RE~v. 887 (1968).
(629)
630 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
federal habeas corpus.7
Another question, however, remained to be considered: In which
district court would the petitions be properly filed? The Fourth Circuit
ruled that the proper forum would be found in the sentencing state,
presumably in the district within that state where a proper respondent
would be available. The district wherein the prisoner is confined,
"where permissible, [would be] infrequently preferable." ' As a result,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Virginia district court's dismissal of
two petitions,' while it vacated the dismissal of the third petition, re-
manding it to the North Carolina district court for further proceedings.' 0
I. THE CUSTODY REQUIREMENT
A. Background
The availability of federal habeas corpus to a state prisoner seeking
to challenge the constitutionality of his detention has recently been sub-
stantially expanded." Deeply rooted in the common law,'2 the writ has
broadened in scope, in keeping with the current revolution in criminal
procedure.
3
7 Under facts strikingly similar to those of the principal case, the Fourth Circuit,
in 1960, denied the application of a state prisoner in Ohio seeking relief in the Eastern
District of Virginia from the effect of a detainer filed against him by the Virginia
Parole Board. As a basis for his contention that the detainer was unlawful, the Ohio
prisoner alleged that the earlier Virginia conviction was void on constitutional grounds.
The court then held that the Virginia Parole Board had neither actual nor construc-
tive custody of the petitioner, and thus the action could not be brought in Virginia.
Whiting v. Chew, 273 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956 (1960). It may
be assumed that the Fourth Circuit considers this case overruled.
8 406 F.2d at 355. Where the conviction in the other state underlies a finding of
recidivism and the imposition of a longer sentence, the district court of the confining
state would have jurisdiction, because: "A state may properly be called upon to defend
its own judgment even though it is predicated upon a foreign conviction." Id. at
357 n.6.
9 Id. at 361.
l0 Id. at 362. Since Williams had never availed himself of North Carolina's post-
conviction remedies (because the petition would not be heard until he was placed in
actual custody and serving his North Carolina sentence), Williams was obliged
to wait until North Carolina reappraised "its position in the presence of the new
atmosphere created by Peyton v. Rowe." Id. at 361. This position seems ironic
where prompt adjudication of constitutional claims has been the stated policy.
The dismissal of the petitions of Word and Matthews also seems to be harsh
treatment in the face of the desired policy. "At the very least, the prisoners should be
afforded an opportunity to amend, instead of having their petitions dismissed." Id. at
365 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting in part). However, since new petitions could be filed
without delay in North Carolina, the prisoners were not prejudiced by the dismissal.
11 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963).
12 For a discussion of the historical approach to habeas corpus, see D. MEADOR,
HABEAs CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA (1966); Oaks, Legal History of the High Court
-Habeas Corpus, 64 MicH. L. REv. 451 (1966).
13 See generally Meador, The Impact of Federal Habeas Corpus on State Trial
Procedure, 52 VA. L. REv. 286 (1966); Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and the
State Court Criminal Defendant, 19 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1966). The federal writ of
habeas corpus has become primarily a means by which one court of general jurisdic-
tion exercises postconviction review over the judgment of another court of like
authority. See Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State
Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rev. 461 (1960).
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The availability of the "great writ" has been limited, however,
by the traditional requirement that the petitioner be "in custody" under
the sentence which he desires to challenge. 4 Section 2241 (c) (3) of
title 28 of the United States Code incorporates this common law
requirement: "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h] e is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States . . ." "5 Until recently,' n the
term "in custody" was interpreted, according to its meaning at common
law, to require both that the petitioner be restrained currently under
the challenged sentence and, as a corollary, that the effect of the writ be
to release the prisoner from that restraint.'
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Peyton v. Rowe 18 took much of
the vitality out of this traditional custody interpretation. Persuaded
in part by the common usage of "custody" to describe the total time
imprisoned, and in part by the fact that the sentences would be lumped
together for parole purposes, the Supreme Court struck down the "pre-
maturity doctrine" of McNally v. Hill " and broadly held that "a
prisoner serving consecutive sentences is 'in custody' under any one of
them for the purposes of section 2241 (c) (3)." 20 He may, therefore,
invoke federal habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of a
sentence to be served in the future. The Peyton Court said that two
considerations led to overruling McNally: first, "to the extent that the
rule of McNally postpones plenary consideration of issues by the district
courts, it undermines the character of the writ of habeas corpus as the
instrument for resolving fact issues not adequately developed in the
original proceedings";"' and second, an application of McNally in the
context of the Peyton case would be at odds with "a principal aim of
the writ," ' which is "to provide for swift judicial review of alleged
unlawful restraints on liberty." 23
14 For a generally critical treatment of the custody requirement prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Peyton v. Rowe, see Note, Habeas Corpus and the Pre-
maturity Rule, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1164 (1966); Note, Habeas Corpus, Custody and
Declaratory Judgment, 53 VA. L. REv. 673 (1967); 65 MIcH. L. REv. 172 (1966).
Historically, habeas corpus was not available to petitioners who were not subject
to an immediate and confining restraint on their liberty. See Collings, Habeas Corpus
for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALin. L. Rnv. 335,
335-38 (1952).
15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964) (emphasis added).
' 0 See, e.g., Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 391 U.S. 54
(1968); Williams v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Virginia, 349
F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1965).
17 See note 14 supra.
18 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
19 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
20 391 U.S. at 67.
21 d. at 63.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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In the principal case, the Fourth Circuit seized upon the newborn
Peyton doctrine 24 as compelling the further result that federal habeas
corpus be available to prisoners attacking not consecutive sentences but
unserved sentences imposed by another state. The Word court offered
two basic justifications for its holding that these unserved sentences
satisfied the custody requirement of section 2241. First, the concomitant
detainer overshadowing each petitioner has sufficient impact on his
current imprisonment to allow construction of a "dual authority" fiction
in which petitioners are deemed to be in custody under the future sen-
tence. This impact is felt in the length of the immediate sentence, since
petitioners are less likely to be released on parole due to the detainers,"
and in the nature of the present confinement, since prisoners under
detainers suffer a higher degree of security and scrutiny in their
incarcerations than normal prisoners.' 6
The second justification rests on policy grounds. The Supreme
Court strongly advanced the policy in Peyton that it is desirable to have
such constitutional claims adjudicated promptly in order to avoid the
probable corrosion of evidence and memories by the passage of several
years, thus impeding any further evidentiary determination that might
become necessary.
From these two justifications the Fourth Circuit's extension of
Peyton follows both logically and as a matter of policy. The court's
explication, however, needs further analysis.
B. Present Impact of the Detainer: Effect on Length of Sentence
In Peyton, the Supreme Court took special note of the fact that the
petitioner's parole eligibility under a Virginia statute was to be calcu-
lated on the basis of the aggregate total of his consecutive sentences.
27
Because of this emphasis, the Fourth Circuit felt constrained to say
that detainers lodged against the present petitioners also operated ad-
versely in parole considerations. This parallel is not perfect. Unlike
the restraint in Peyton, the effect on parole eligibility in Word is not
compelled by statute. Under the Virginia statute,28 there is no mention
24 Even before the Peyton decision, at least one commentator believed that it was
not material where the prisoner was actually confined so long as the custodian was
within the power of the court. D. MEADOR, supra note 12, at 42.
25 406 F.2d at 354. Prisoners are selected for parole primarily on the basis of
the parole board's evaluation of the individual prisoner's prospects for re-assimilation
into society. For a thorough discussion of the factors in parole selection, see DRESSLER,
PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 106-20 (2d ed. 1969). See also
NEWmAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS (3d ed. 1968).
26406 F.2d at 354. This argument has also been advanced in other contexts.
E.g., Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (federal prisoners
seeking declaration that restrictions imposed upon them because of state detainers
violated their constitutional rights) ; Gregory v. Page, 289 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Okla.
1968) (federal prisoner seeking injunctive relief). See generally Note, The Detainer:
A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1190 (1948);
Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 WAsr. U.L.Q. 417.
27 391 U.S. at 64-65.
2 8 VA. CODE AW. § 53-251 (1967).
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that a future sentence to be served in another state figures in the calcu-
lation of parole eligibility.
Nevertheless, although statutory compulsion is absent, the detainer
may well have a subtle, indirect impact on parole selection. In
evaluating an application for parole, the parole board considers the
prisoner's prospects for a successful reentry into society.' A prisoner
against whom a detainer has been lodged will not reenter society upon
release. Hence, any evaluation of his application involves speculation
about the prisoner's distant, uncertain future which the parole board
may be unwilling to make. Instead, the board will generally, like the
congressional committee faced with an unpopular bill, pigeonhole the
parole application."
In addition to reducing the prisoner's chance to obtain parole, the
detainer reflects an unfortunate plight brought about by concurrent
state sentencing powers, which generally cause multi-jurisdictional
offenders to serve longer total sentences than they would have had to
serve had they committed the crimes within any one state. Each state
tends to extract full satisfaction for the offenses against it, ignoring the
prisoner's criminal liability to other jurisdictions. Hypothetically, if
only one court were to try the multi-state offender for all crimes, it could
more easily put the different offenses in perspective, notwithstanding
the fact that they were committed in more than one state, and prescribe
sentence with a view to both the amount of punishment necessary and
the possibility of rehabilitation. 8
On a practical level, therefore, the detainer and the future sentence
tend to create restraints on a prisoner's liberty. Because they increase
the time to be served on his aggregate sentences, and because they
reduce the possibility of his parole, the prisoner finds himself facing
prolonged incarceration when he might otherwise be released.
C. Present Impact of the Detainer: Nature of the Confinement
Even though the Peyton Court was concerned only with the effect
of the future sentence upon the duration of the prisoner's confinement,
the Word court further considered the detainer's interference with the
nature of that confinement.- The court pointed out that the warden
was required to jail the prisoner with a greater degree of security than
the Virginia commitment alone demanded 3 Whether a prisoner has
29 DRESsLm, supra note 25, at 100-04.
30 1966 WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 26, at 421-22. See generally Note, Habeas
Corpus-The Nature of Restraint in Parole and Probation, 40 CoNN. B.J. 473 (1966).
81 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q., supra note 26, at 423; see Perry, Effect of Detainers on
Sentencing Policies, 9 FED. PROBATION no. 3, July-Sept., 1945, at 11-12.
32 406 F.2d at 355.
33 This requirement, however, stems from the executive branch of the government;
for the administration of prisons falls under the purview of neither the legislative nor
the judicial branches, and the courts "will only intervene in cases of extreme hard-
ship." Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 714 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (dictum).
See, e.g., Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
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an enforceable right, however, to have his "level of custody" modulated
in response to such extrinsic factors as the presence or absence of de-
tainers is a question still unanswered. 34 Generally speaking, prison
authorities have made the judgment, based upon experience, that
prisoners with detainers should be treated more restrictively." Even
if the judgment of prison authorities seems to be at odds with modem
correction and rehabilitation theories, the courts traditionally will not
even consider intervening, except in cases of cruel or unusual
punishment.36
To say that the fact that the prisoner is subjected to a higher level
of confinement because of the detainer does not, by itself, satisfy the
custody requirement is not to say that this consideration, when linked
with its indirect impact upon the duration of the prisoner's jail term,
should not be given weight in applying Peyton. The prisoner under
shadow of a detainer, precluded from attaining trusty status 17 and from
gaining access to the constructive, useful jobs at the prison, has little
opportunity to do the kinds of things that develop a good prison record
or that demonstrate his readiness for return to the outside. Hence, even
34 But see Gregory v. Page, 289 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Okla. 1968) (state's detainer
warrant lodged against a prisoner did not deprive him of his constitutional rights by
making him ineligible for parole or trusty status). But cf. Lawrence v. Blackwell,
298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (state's continued failure to make good-faith efforts
to secure federal prisoners a speedy trial on state charges must not result in con-
tinuance of prison restrictions flowing from those charges).
35As a former director of the United States Bureau of Prisons has stated,
those "prisoners with detainers are evaluated individually but there remains a tendency
to consider them escape risks and assign them accordingly." Bennett, The Last Full
Ounce, 23 FED. PROBATION, June 1959, at 20, 21, quoted in Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298
F. Supp. 708, 713 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See Hess v. Blackwell, 409 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 805 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
36 E.g., Startti v. Beto, 405 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1969). A Texas prisoner was
caught acting as a lookout for other inmates who were involved in a poker game.
Placed in solitary confinement on a diet of bread and water for nine days, the prisoner
sought relief through a mandamus action based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1965). The court denied relief, holding that: "The petitioner's com-
plaint does not rise to the constitutional level but deals with matters of prison discipline
solely the concern of the state." Id. at 859. See United States ex rel. Lee v.
Illinois, 343 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337
F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965) ; Tabor v. Hardwick, 224
F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956).
Competing with the courts' understandable reluctance to interfere with internal
prison administration, however, is the growing "realization that certain constitutional
guarantees protect even convicts . . . ." Equal Protection and Prison-to-Hospital
Transfers: United States ex tel. Schuster v. Herold, 118 U. PA. L. Rav. 410 (1970).
The idea that a prisoner is completely without any rights or remedies has met with in-
creasing repudiation by the courts; but the courts have not yet abandoned the general
rule of noninterference; and complaints directed toward the warden's evaluation of a
prisoner's security risk will be scrutinized usually by a strict "cruel and unusual
punishment' standard; see Graham, When a Convict Becomes a Plaintiff, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 4, 1970, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6. See generally Note, Constitutional Rights
of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 985, 995-1006 (1962). But cf.
United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 90
S. Ct. 81 (1969) ; Equal Protection and Prison-to-Hospital Transfers: United States
ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 410 (1970).
3
7 An inmate who has special privileges and who lives and works in and about
the institution under less restrictive conditions is commonly called a trusty by prison
authorities.
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if the parole board looks at this prisoner's parole application,3" it is
not likely to act favorably because of his unimpressive record.
D. The "Dual Authority" Fiction: Rationalization for a Policy Decision
Even though the detainer and the future sentence clearly affect the
prisoner's present confinement, it remains to be explained why he can
be deemed to be "in custody" now, in order to have standing to invoke
federal habeas corpus under section 2241. Since the prisoner is not
attacking his present conviction and sentence, this explanation must
involve the peculiar situation in which the prisoner, legally confined,
maintains that he is illegally "in custody."
To solve this problem, the Fourth Circuit attempted to link the
detainer and a proper North Carolina respondent with the petitioner's
immediate confinement by adopting the "dual authority" fiction. The
custody requirement is thus met by the assertion that the Virginia
warden's authority to hold a prisoner against whom a detainer has been
filed is "clearly dual." " However, except as a useful fiction, this
proposition has no basis in fact: the prisoner is not being held under
the legal authority of North Carolina, for the detainer does not consti-
tute authority to restrain a prisoner; it is merely a request to hold him
temporarily, and the jailer gives it only what effect he chooses." The
court supports its fiction with the statement that "[t]he prisoner has
no hope of release until both authorizations are ended . . . ," 41 but it
is unlikely that the warden would keep a prisoner whose sentence term
has ended if the authorities who had lodged the detainer did not claim
him in a few days.
Although the theory of the court may be unrealistic, the fiction's
use can be supported. While the detainer does not attach to the prisoner
as legal authority for his confinement, it does have an impact on his
present custody 4 ' Thus, to the extent that the North Carolina detainer
and unserved sentence affect the duration of the petitioner's Virginia
commitment, there is practical significance in the dual authority concept.
The more persuasive reason, however, for employing the dual
authority fiction is the policy expressed in Peyton v. Rowe.43 Use of
8 8 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
39 406 F.2d at 355.
40 See,' e.g., Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1968), in which the
court stated:
[s]o far as we can tell, the detainer or warrant issued by the State of Wash-
ington does not purport to have any extraterritorial effect, assuming that
somehow it could. If it has any effect in Florida, that is only because Florida
chooses to give it that effect.
Id. at 126. See Whiting v. Chew, 273 F. 2d 885 (4th Cir. 1960) (opinion by Sobeloff,
C.). But cf. Sloope v. Peyton, 290 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Va. 1968).
41406 F.2d at 355.
42 See notes 30-31 mipra.
43 391 U.S. 54, 59, 63 (1968).
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the fiction provides an immediate forum for the prompt adjudication of
the petitioner's constitutional claims, which might otherwise be denied
because of the niceties of the custody rule. Since a factual hearing on
issues not developed in the challenged proceedings and the ordering of
a new trial are present possibilities, "custody" obstacles placed in the
way of timely resolution of such claims would tend to jeopardize the
prisoner's opportunity to vindicate his rights; for the passage of time
inevitably means that evidence will be lost or destroyed, memories will
fade, and witnesses will die.44 Acceptance of the dual authority fiction,
therefore, helps to disperse some of the confusion enshrouding searches
for "restraints on liberty" in the case of prisoners, legally jailed,
attempting to attack the constitutional validity of an unserved sentence
imposed by another jurisdiction.
I. THE PROBLEM OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
Allowing prisoners to attack the constitutional validity of an un-
served sentence imposed by another jurisdiction, a possibility existing
only since Peyton v. Rowe was decided in 1968, raises the issue of
which district courts afford a proper forum. Looking only to the dual
authority fiction, either the district of confinement or a district in the
sentencing state, or both, could be deemed to be a proper forum. The
Word court, however, concluded that generally the proper federal forum
is in the sentencing state. The major problem in determining the
answer to this territorial puzzle stems from the ambiguity found in the
statutory language. Section 2241, which confers the power to issue
the writ, provides: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
• . . district courts . . . . within their respective jurisdictions." '
The Supreme Court, in Ahrens v. Clark,4" construed this lan-
guage 47 as a territorial limitation imposed by Congress on the power
to issue the writ. The Court held that a federal district court lacks
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus if the person detained is
not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court when the petition is
44406 F.2d at 354; 53 VA. L. REv., supra note 14, at 675.
45 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (1964) (emphasis added).
46335 U.S. 188 (1948). Deportation orders had been issued by the Attorney
General of the United States, directing the removal of some 120 Germans under the
authority of a presidential proclamation. Petitions for habeas corpus were filed with
the District Court for the District of Columbia, where the Attorney General was
located, while the German petitioners were being held at Ellis Island, New York,
awaiting removal. The respondent moved to dismiss, because the petitioners were out-
side the territorial confines of the District of Columbia. The petitioners argued that,
although confined in New York, they were subject to the custody and control of the
Attorney General. The district court dismissed the petitions, the court of appeals
dismissed the appeal, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
47 Although the language construed by the Ahrens Court was that of the Act of
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, the language of its successor statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1964), is substantially the same. See 406 F.2d at 362-63 n.4 (Winter, J., dis-
senting); Duncan v. Maine, 295 F.2d 528 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
998 (1962).
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filed.48  The Court said:
Although the writ is directed to the person in whose
custody the party is detained, . . . the statutory scheme con-
templates a procedure which may bring the prisoner before
the court. . . . It would take compelling reasons to conclude
that Congress contemplated the production of prisoners from
remote sections, perhaps thousands of miles from the District
Court that issued the writ. The opportunities for escape af-
forded by travel, the cost of transportation, the administrative
burden of such an undertaking negate such a purpose. These
are matters of policy which counsel us to construe the juris-
dictional provision of the statute in the conventional sense,
even though in some situations return of the prisoner to the
court where he was tried and convicted might seem to offer
some advantages. 9
Although the Ahrens court was not concerned with the peculiar
problem of multi-state offenders, nor with the need to forge an adequate
remedy for those challenging future sentences across state lines,"' the
lower courts faced with this problem have generally followed the Ahrens
rule by requiring the presence of both the petitioner and the jailer within
the court's territorial jurisdiction. 1 A departure from the spirit of the
Ahrens rule has occurred in cases where the petitioner was detained
outside the jurisdiction of any district court and the official authorizing
the detention was within the court's territorial reach."
4 8 Except for the decision in the principal case, the courts of appeals have applied
the broad Ahrens language in considering cases on point with the principal case.
George v. Nelson, 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel. Van Scoten v.
Pennsylvania, 404 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1968) ; Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1968) ; Booker v. Arkansas, 380 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1967); Duncan v. Maine
295 F.2d 528 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962); Whiting v. Chew,
273 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 956 (1960) (alternative holding)
(probably overruled by the principal case; note 7 supra).
49 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190-91 (1948). The Court's practical con-
siderations lose much of their force when viewed in light of the modem state and
federal practice of transporting prisoners across state lines to stand trial in other
jurisdictions and then transporting them back to continue service of their current
sentences.
50 406 F2d at 360 (distinguishing Ahrens).
51 See cases cited in note 48 supra. See also Halprin v. United States, 293 F.
Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lewis v. Connett, 291 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
But see Sanders v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (dictum).
The Ahrens rule has been cited in other contexts as well, e.g., McDowell v.
Sacramento Local Bd. Group, Bds. 21, 22 & 23, 264 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Cal. 1967)
(petitioner attacking proceedings of local and state appeal boards in induction transfer)
(alternative holding); Powell v. Langlois, 204 F. Supp. 91 (E.D.N.C. 1962) (prison
escapee in another state awaiting extradition).
.52The Ahrens Court had specifically reserved this question, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4.
S e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (semble), rehearing denied, 346 U.S.
84 (1953) (per curiam) (separate opinion by Frankfurter, J.) ; Day v. Wilson, 247
F.2d 60 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also United States ex tel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
638 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Recently, however, a conflict in the circuits has developed over the
effect to be given Ahrens. In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit went
well beyond Ahrens in ruling that a state prisoner who brings an attack
on a future sentence in another state must file his petition in the federal
forum where the sentencing court is to be found. However, the Ninth
Circuit in George v. Nelson " cited Ahrens in deciding that a petitioner
confined in California, but also under a North Carolina detainer, could
properly challenge the North Carolina sentence in the confining district.
The George court noted that its result was not necessarily inconsistent
with Word, since Word did not categorically rule out the district of
confinement as a proper forum. Word only said, continued George,
that the district of confinement "where permissible [is] infrequently
preferable." Despite this language in George, it is quite clear that the
George and Word holdings are, for the most part, inconsistent: Word
held that the district of confinement was not a proper forum; and, in an
analogous situation, George held that it was.
Thus, it remains unclear whether a prisoner wishing to bring
habeas corpus to challenge a future sentence underlying a present de-
tainer should file his suit in the confining or sentencing state. He can
point to authority for either choice. The uncertainty present in this
area calls for a reexamination of the rules for forum selection in habeas
corpus cases; wooden application of the Ahrens doctrine may not
provide the best results.
A. Section 2241: The Requirement That Courts Issue Writs
"Within Their Respective Jurisdictions"
The Ahrens Court held that the district court's jurisdiction de-
pended upon the presence of the habeas corpus petitioner within its
territorial bounds. However, application of the Ahrens rule to the
Word case is not compelled by that holding. The possibility that a
habeas corpus petition could be brought by a state prisoner to challenge
a future sentence of a foreign state has existed only since the Court's
decision in Peyton v. Rowe. Ahrens did not face that problem. The
11 (1955) (by implication); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1949)
(Douglas, J., concurring). But cf. Carbo v. United States, 363 U.S. 611 (1961) (writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum different from the "Great Writ") ; see Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum).
153 410 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari in the George case to decide these questions:
Is warden of California prison proper party respondent in one of his inmates'
federal habeas corpus attack upon future North Carolina sentence, pursuant
to which detainer has been lodged against inmate? . . . Does California
federal court have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petition brought by
California prisoner attacking a future North Carolina sentence that has led
to the lodging of a detainer against prisoner?
38 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1969). See Hearne v. Washington State Parole
Bd., 300 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Wash. 1969) (court did not have territorial jurisdiction
to entertain Kansas state prisoner's habeas petition seeking to challenge unserved
Washington state sentence).
[Vo1.118:629
HABEAS CORPUS
Court there was dealing with petitioners confined under the express au-
thority of the Attorney General of the United States by a warden who
was an United States official. Thus, by requiring that the petitioners
bring suit in the confining district, the Court was merely fitting the fact
situation into the traditional habeas corpus pattern calling for the
prisoner to file the action against the official confining him. This re-
quirement presented no particular problem in Ahrens, because the actual
confining official was clearly under the authority of the local federal
jurisdiction responsible for the restraint. In the fact pattern presented
by Word, however, the official actually confining the petitioner was not
under the authority of the foreign jurisdiction responsible for the
challenged sentence; authority for his confinement derived from the
Commonwealth of Virginia under a conviction and sentence which
were admittedly legal. This posture presented problems which could
not have been anticipated by Congress in enacting the habeas corpus
statute, nor by the Ahrens Court in construing it. The ambiguous
meaning of "within their respective jurisdictions," therefore, might
justifiably be taken beyond the Ahrens holding.
A statutory interpretation more consistent with the increasing
availability of federal habeas corpus would seek to ease the geographic
constraints imposed by a broad reading of Ahrens. While a territorial
limitation on the judicial power to issue writs of habeas corpus was
doubtless intended by Congress, there is no indication that a limitation
was contemplated that was as severe as that articulated in the Ahrens
opinion. Congress, chiefly concerned with limiting federal courts' power
to issue process against jailers in other states, was reluctant to extend
the reach of a district court's process beyond state boundaries.54 How-
ever, where the "confining authority" is present within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ, the abuse which the words,
"within their respective jurisdictions," were designed to remedy would
not be possible. Thus, a more sensible interpretation of section 2241
would require only the presence within the district of a proper respond-
ent to the habeas corpus petition,55 a respondent who caused the allegedly
illegal sentence to bear upon the petitioner in some fashion.
Construed in this manner, the statute presents no jurisdictional
barrier to either the Word or George result. Obviously, in Word, the
North Carolina authorities responsible for petitioner's future sentence
and the detainer attached to his present sentence were located in the
North Carolina District. In George, the confining warden also was a
proper respondent, assuming that the dual authority fiction satisfies
6 4 CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 730, 790 (1849). The legislative history
speaks in terms of preventing courts from compelling the appearance of out-of-state
prisoners. However, this compulsion may only be effectuated by issuing process
against the out-of-state jailer.
55 Requiring only a proper respondent is more in line with traditional habeas
corpus concepts. See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193-98 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) ; Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 845, 851-52 (1969).
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the custody requirement of section 2241, since he was giving effect to
the allegedly illegal detainer.
B. Evaluation of the Alternatives
Although the sentencing state and the state of confinement both
afford jurisdictionally appropriate forums for a habeas corpus challenge
of a future sentence, it is possible to make some evaluation of the rela-
tive convenience of each forum. The policy of expanding the avail-
ability of the writ impels the conclusion that the Word approach is
preferable, and that the petition should be filed in the sentencing state.
The writ can then be employed most effectively to achieve adequate
relief and prompt adjudication of petitioner's claim.
The Word court correctly perceived that a habeas corpus petition,
challenging a future sentence and brought in the state presently confin-
ing the petitioner, would face a serious obstacle: there are no North
Carolina officials subject to service of process in Virginia. Therefore,
unless North Carolina officials appear voluntarily in Virginia, the court
will lack personal jurisdiction over them. Hence, if the court desired
to grant full relief, it would be forced to invalidate a North Carolina
sentence on the basis of the appearance of the Viriginia warden.
This situation presents two problems. First, without service of
sentencing authorities, the court might not assume jurisdiction to con-
sider the conviction. The judisdictional requirement could be met
technically by deeming the Virginia warden a North Carolina agent
pursuant to the dual authority concept. However, practical questions
would still abound concerning the desirability of permitting a district
court to invalidate a foreign state's conviction on the basis of what is
likely to be a half-hearted defense.56
Furthermore, principles of comity suggest that the district courts
in the confining district would be well advised to refrain from adjudi-
cating the merits of claims. Federal judges in the sentencing state are
probably better qualified to evaluate local convictions due to their
familiarity with the local criminal process. Without the appearance of
sentencing authorities, a hearing in the confining state would be
hampered by the fact that confining authorities, attempting to defend
the conviction, would start out with a basic unfamiliarity with the case.
Considerations such as these influenced the Word court to compel the
petitioner to bring habeas corpus in the sentencing state.
The George court, of course, was faced with the same problems.
Its response was to rely upon the willingness of confining authorities to
defend the foreign conviction and upon the ability of the sentencing
state to defend in the confining state, if necessary. The court said, "If
the California warden does not wish to defend the North Carolina con-
viction he can call upon the authorities of North Carolina to provide
r6 See text accompanying note 58 infra.
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that defense." "
That the warden of the confining state, in all likelihood, would not
defend against the petition was recognized by the Fourth Circuit. The
warden has given effect to the detainer at the request of the foreign
state, not his own. It is the judgment and unserved sentence of the
foreign state which are under attack, and which are properly defended
by the foreign state's attorney general. The evidence and witnesses (ex-
cept the prisoner) are to be found in the other state; and it is the foreign
state which is chiefly concerned with the outcome. 8 However, if the
foreign state does not defend when called, and if the court cannot obtain
jurisdiction over the proper authorities in that state, the court probably
will dispense only limited relief. Assuming that the district court in the
confining state will be reluctant to invalidate the future sentence, it
might limit the order to directing the warden to give no effect to
the detainer. 9 On the other hand, if jurisdiction over the other state's
officials is assumed through the dual authority fiction and the "agency"
of the confining warden, broader relief, although possible, is not
desirable.60
In order to achieve complete relief, therefore, the petitioner must
seek a forum in the sentencing state. However, because of the contro-
versy currently brewing over the applicability of the Ahrens rule to the
question of territorial jurisdiction, an unfortunate petitioner may find
that the sentencing state lies within a circuit considering itself bound
by a broad reading of Ahrens."' In that event the petitioner would be
rebuffed and told to seek relief in the confining state.
In the confining state, eliminating the detainer might have an im-
mediate impact, reducing the severity of the petitioner's present level of
custody; but it would not affect the eventual service of the allegedly
invalid future sentence. Since the primary purpose of the petitioner
is to avoid serving that sentence if it is invalid, the petitioner should be
permitted to bring his habeas corpus action in a federal court in the
sentencing state, where the court will clearly have the power to adjudi-
cate the constitutional claims. Otherwise, the prisoner will probably
receive only partial relief in the confining state.62
67 410 F2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1969).
58 406 F.2d at 355.
59 Id. at 357 n.6. Even if the court ordered that the warden give no effect to the
detainer, it would not necessarily follow that the warden must somehow change
the status of the prisoner. Perhaps it might be the warden's judgment that the
prisoner's demeanor still requires that he be held in maximum security. Whether
under these circumstances a prisoner has a further remedy remains doubtful. See
note 34 supra.
1o See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
61 This availability of a complete remedy depends, of course, upon whether the
district court in the sentencing state considers itself bound by Ahrens or by a deci-
sion of its court of appeals. See, e.g., Hearne v. Washington State Parole Bd., 300
F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Wash. 1969). See also cases cited note 48 supra.
6 2 But see 406 F.2d at 365 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
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III. CONCLUSION
The Word decision is an attempt to afford a prisoner prompt
adjudication of alleged violations of his constitutional rights in the
forum most capable of providing a fair determination of his claim. In
reaching its result, the court chose to disregard certain habeas corpus
doctrines unresponsive to the needs of the law in its present state of
development. The Fourth Circuit thus offers a model decision expand-
ing the scope of federal habeas corpus, a development which the other
circuits should be encouraged to recognize.
